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Branded Versus Generic Competition?
A Kind Word for the Branded Drugs
By RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
I. Danger in Transition
Transitions are times of danger in virtually all areas of human
life. More accidents are likely to occur when cars go in and out of
parking spaces, or when planes take off or land.' More medical
mishaps are likely to happen in hospitals when there is a change in
shifts between nurses.2 The same pattern holds in the law of
pharmaceutical patents, during the transition from a fully proprietary
regime to one that allows for as many firms as possible to market a
generic version of a once-protected pharmaceutical patent.
The difficulties of this system were made evident in the lengthy
discussion of the six month coexclusivity period under the Hatch-
Waxman Act' that has been extensively discussed in many articles.'
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, the
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and a senior lecturer at
the University of Chicago. My thanks to Isaac Gruber, the University of Chicago Law
School, class of 2012, for his usual excellent research assistance.
1. See Mike Antich & Lauren Colin, Accident Management: Costs Trending Upward,
AUTOMOTIVE FLEET, Jul. 2008, at 16, 18 (finding that parking lots are the most common
car accident location, representing 25% of accidents overall). See also State of Cal. Dep't
of Transp. Div. of Aeronautics, California Airport Land Use Planning Handbook 8-8
(Jan. 2002), available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/planninglaeronaut/documents/
ALUPHComplete-7-02rev.pdf (finding that only 7% of commercial air accidents take
place greater than five miles from an airport).
2. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Bailit & May Hsieh Blanchard, The Effect of House Staff
Working Hours on the Quality of Obstetric and Gynecologic Care, 103 (4) OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 613, 615 (April 2004) ("although physicians may be more rested [given
more frequent shift changes], the errors associated with the increase in shift changes that
occur with shorter shifts may offset the gains to be made from decreasing sleep
deprivation.").
3. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-
Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355).
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Hatch-Waxman is intended to encourage the first generic to launch a
so-called "Paragraph IV" challenge to an existing drug on the ground
that the patent is invalid or the new entrant does not infringe the
patentee's patent.! For the most part, it appears that the generic
manufacturers make rational calculations in their decisions on which
patents to challenge and when to challenge them, often by going after
the weakest link in the valuable patent. But at the same time, there
is an evident risk that collusive agreements between the incumbent
patent holder and the first generic entry could slow down the entry of
other generic manufacturers into the marketplace, thereby creating
welfare losses through their market division. The customary account
of patent law treats these arrangements as though they are an
impediment to social welfare by delaying the time when new generic
entry can lower the price of the drug for all persons in question. The
same position is taken by Michael Carrier" with respect to "product
hopping," the concerted effort of incumbent patentees to shift their
customer base over to a new drug in the same class as the drug over
which patent protection has expired in whole or in part. The shift
from a tablet to capsule is one common strategy. To pass judgment
on these issues, it is often necessary to ask the thankless question of
whether the supposed advances in science exceed the preclusive
effect that arises if the original product is removed from the Orange
Book-or official FDA registry of drugs available for sale-in ways
that limit competition.' One common theme that unites the articles in
4. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge
Drug Patents? (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 379, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1640512.
5. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2010).
6. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 4 ("Our results provide support for the
proposition that generic drug makers opportunistically challenge weaker patents that
block entry.").
7. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
reverse payment agreements per se illegal); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharma., Inc., 344
F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding those same payments not per se illegal). For a
smattering of the scholarship, see Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Balancing Ease and
Accuracy in Assessing Pharmaceutical Exclusion Payments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 712 (2004);
Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust
Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747 (2002).
8. Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009 (2010).
9. This was the central issue in the so-called TriCor litigation. See Richard Epstein,
The Intersection of Antitrust, Patents, and FDA Law: The TriCor Litigation, GCP: THE
ONLINE MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY (Mar. 2009, Release Two)
(expressing caution about the general use of monopolization claims under Section 2 of the
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this Symposium is their desire to shift the balance of legal power
toward the new entrant as against the incumbent.
I think that the drift of the current argument pushes the balance
too much in favor of the generic side of the equation. I reach this
conclusion in part because my own activity in the pharmaceutical
industry-none of which is current-has been on behalf of the
research pharmaceutical companies. I am all too well aware of the
way in which they have been buffeted by a wide range of
developments. To put this discussion about generic entry into larger
perspective, it is necessary at the outset to place two additional items
on the table. First, it is important to recount at the outset the various
developments that have compromised the legal climate for innovation
in recent years, leading to what has now become apparent, a decline
of both new molecular entities and the level of research and
development in the industry on the other, without signs of a near
term reversal. The second addresses the relative importance of two
kinds of competition. The first is between the patented drug and its
generic competitors. The second is between two patented drugs,
neither of which has any a generic variants on the market. Once these
two points are essayed, it could well turn out that the real risk today
lies in the lagging development of new drugs, not in the wider
dissemination of those that have gone off patent. If so, then the
obvious legal tilt toward generics could calibrate the balance in the
wrong way.
II. Obstacles To New Drugs
There is little dispute today that the rate of drug innovation is
falling. The major question has to do with its causes. One issue is, of
course, that the past advances in medical technology have taken all
the low-hanging fruit. The newer approaches have to deal with more
complex conditions that are harder to attack by some single simple
maneuver. We are no longer at the stage where innovative dietary
changes can stop such vitamin-deficiency diseases as pellagra,
beriberi, and scurvy, or even at the stage where the isolation of insulin
can put a huge dent in the management of diabetes.' We are instead
left with complex cancers on the one hand, and difficult to understand
Sherman Act). The TriCor litigation resulted in a $184-million settlement. See Shirley S.
Wang, Abbott to Pay $184 Million in Tricor Suits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008, at B4.
10. For how this played out, see Richard A. Epstein, The Tale of How Insulin Came
to Market, DEFINING IDEAS: A HOOVER INSTITUTION JOURNAL (Jan. 2, 2011), available
at http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/61436.
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diseases like autism and Alzheimer's disease, which may depend on
complex interactions of multiple biological and environmental
factors, on the other. But even after we allow for this steep climb up
the cost curve, the changes in the last dozen years or so make it clear
that institutional changes that are introduced to "protect" consumers
can themselves have serious side effects in terms of reduced
innovation.
A. FDA Standards for Clinical Trials
Without question, the entire practice of clinical trials has gotten
longer and more protracted today than ever before. At every
juncture, the FDA insists upon more trials with respect to more
possible side effects than it has done in previous years. One recent
illustration involves the prescription diet pill Contrave, which the
FDA declined to approve as a treatment for obesity because its
maker, Orexigen Therapeutics, need to first perform a "long term
study" to ensure that the drug does not increase the risk of heart
attacks." This decision was not an isolated event, as in previous
months the FDA took the same hard stand against two other diet
drugs. As a matter of general drug policy, the decision offers
troublesome confirmation that the FDA is more concerned about
remote future risks than it is about palpable current ones, so much so
that one commentator lamented that in the current environment "tap
water would not be approved," 2 doubtless because of its countless
impurities.
For these purposes, the key point is that these FDA decisions
clearly filter back into antecedent decisions, including the ever-
greater need to conduct overseas trials, where it is harder to keep tabs
on their operations. At the same time, the costs of running these
trials in the United States have increased because of an increased
reluctance of people to enter into clinical trials, just at the time when
more subjects need to be recruited into them." Accordingly, many ill
people seek to avoid the delays of clinical trials by seeking to use any
drug that has passed Phase I trials, so long as it is not believed
unacceptably toxic to human beings in the quantities they are likely to
11. See Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Fails to Approve Contrave, a New Diet Drug, N.Y.
TIMES Feb. 2, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/business/02drug.html.
12. Id. (quoting Morgan Downey, editor of the online Downey Obesity Report).
13. See Carl Elliott, Guinea-Pigging, NEW YORKER, Jan. 7, 2007, available at http://
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/07/080107fafact elliott (detailing the difficulties
in filling out clinical trials).
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use. 14 The protocols for starting these programs are more complex
than before because of the heightened level of activity by Institutional
Review Boards that add cost and slow down the rate of development.
The number of new drugs that make it through the FDA approval
process remains stagnant at best" and the percentage of drugs in
clinical trials that make it through the FDA approval process has
dropped from about 14 percent a decade ago to about 8 percent in
more recent years. Clearly, this rate of return does not go unnoticed
by drug companies, who have to be more selective in their research
agendas. Research budgets have already contracted in light of the
new realities about the probability of drug approvals, from a peak in
nominal constant dollars of about $47 billion in 2007 to about $44
billion today. 6
Those changes are reflected in particular disease areas. Right
now there is a vast increase in the frequency and intensity of diabetes.
Yet recently, four major companies have terminated their research
programs because they cannot cope with the ever-higher demand in
clinical trials, which demand huge investments today with reduced
chances of approval and success years down the road. 7 One reason
for this shift in emphasis has been the manifest alteration in the
operation of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act," which goes
through multiple alterations, as it is reauthorized on a five-year cycle
(with the added effect of introducing other collateral changes in
practice). In its original inception, the program allowed
pharmaceutical companies to make direct contributions to the FDA
so that it could hasten the approval process for potentially high rate
returns. In its early years, PDUFA appears to have done just that,
notwithstanding the peculiar situation in which the companies supply
14. For an expression of those concerns, see Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Dev. Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
15. Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Drug Approvals Slipped in 2010: Some Potential
Blockbusters Suffered Delays Amid FDA's Tougher Safety Stance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31,
2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB00014240527487045430045760521703358
71018.html.
16. Gardiner Harris, Federal Research Center Will Help Develop Medicines, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/health/policy/
23drug.html.
17. See T.R. Franson, Has the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 Impaired Drug
Development?, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS, Feb. 2011, at 169,
available at http://www.nature.com/clpt/journal/v89/n2/pdf/clpt2010301a.pdf.
18. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491
(1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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the FDA with funding for the approval process of their own drugs."
Thus, as approval times shortened, the quality of the approvals
remained constant, resulting in gains for both consumers and
producers that far exceed the sums invested by the company.2 But in
its most recent iteration in 2007, the entire focus of the program has
changed, as a greater fraction of PDUFA revenues have been
devoted to ex post surveillance, including the creation of risk
evaluation mitigation strategies, or REMS, whose broad scale
implementation has left far less money in the till for PDUFA's
original mission. Any alteration in the interface between branded
and generic drugs can only aggravate this difficulty.
B. Patent Standards
The second set of obstacles arises in connection with the patent
system. One issue arises with the assistance that the Hatch-Waxman
Act provides for the producers of new drugs. The purpose of the Act
is to allow for periods of up to five years to offset the time that the
new drugs languished in clinical trials without proof of sales. As
clinical trials get longer, the effective terms of patents, i.e., the years
that they are available for sale, get shorter. That development both
delays the entry of the new drug to market and reduces the number of
years of marketing exclusivity. The losses in those out-years are often
substantial, as patent drugs typically pick up market share in their last
years of life.
In addition, it seems to be more likely now that patent challenges
will be successful on a variety of grounds, which again reduce the
incentives for innovation. 2' The point here is not that all these
challenges are inappropriate, for clearly a system as imperfect as the
American patent system is capable of issuing patents that should be
properly denied. But it is the rising level and frequency of successful
challenges that is the source of concern. Higher rates of invalidation
lead to lower rates of innovation, all other things being held equal.
19. This process has been repeatedly attacked on abstract grounds by individuals who
typically do not trouble themselves with the evidence on the ground. See, e.g., MARCIA
ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 208 (2004).
20. See Tomas Philipson et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis of the FDA: The Case of the
Prescription Drug User Fee Acts, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1306 (2008).
21. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 2.
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C. Pricing
The third set of difficulties with the patent system involves the
attacks on its basic pricing structure. Drugs are expensive in the
United States relative to their costs in other countries, where state
monopsonists can often bargain down the prices for the benefit of
local consumers. Yet it is equally clear that no system of marginal
cost pricing is sustainable over the long run because it does not allow
for any drug company to recover the high fixed costs needed to get
the first pill into the marketplace.2 2 Yet the constant pressure to allow
for the re-importation of drugs from overseas and to increase the
level of government purchases at restricted rates through Medicaid all
cast a pall over the basic pricing structure, which again translates into
lower levels of innovation.
D. Tort Liability
The fourth set of difficulties with the patent system relates to
possible exposures to tort liability. Right now, the movement in the
case law is strongly toward the position that the preemption defense
cannot be raised on grounds of conflict, field occupation, or
frustration of the Congressional purposes.23 I am comfortable with all
three of these defenses on the ground that with respect to
standardized products, an ex ante set of uniform warnings should be
used to supply all the needed information to consumers, while
blocking the enormous exposure to tort liability that necessarily
hampers innovation. I think that the tough approach on preemption is
needed because right now the tendency inside the FDA is, as noted
above, to be unduly risk averse. Too few products make it to market,
and for them the FDA warnings are often too strong. It is wrong,
therefore, to create a global impression that somehow the FDA has
fallen down on the job so that tort suits, brought years after the
release of the drug, become the offset for FDA inefficiency.24 All too
22. See John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (2004). See also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litigation, 186 F.3d 781, 784-85 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining price discrimination by
prescription drug manufacturers).
23. For the basic framework, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1947), which I severely criticize in Richard A. Epstein, What Tort Theory Tells Us About
Federal Preemption: The Tragic Saga of Wyeth v. Levine, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
485, 487-88 (2010).
24. For that view, see David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination
of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008); for my
SUMMER 20111 BRANDED VERSUS GENERIC 465
466 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
often, the opposite is likely to happen, whereby harsh tort judgments
by juries moved by the plight of individual plaintiffs only reinforce
the negative environment in which new pharmaceuticals are
developed and brought to market.
III. Interbrand Competition
These developments require placing the issue of generic entry in
a larger institutional context. The simple inquiry is this: the efforts
today to boost the position of generic drugs in the marketplace come
at an implicit price that it is all too easy to overlook. The increase in
generic/branded competition over some particular drug comes at the
cost of an expected reduction in competition between different
branded drugs used to treat the same condition. In some cases, the
new drug that does not get developed is in the same class as the ones
that have just gone generic. That is surely the situation with the
market for diet drugs, which has not seen a new entry since Xenical in
1999, which is now little used.25 The decision to let a new drug on the
market has two desirable effects. First, it increases the options for
treatment that are available on the market today, even before a
patented drug goes into its generic state, which could be years away.
So we get more competition sooner. Second, the new entrant may
well prove to be more desirable for some users in a given class than
the current incumbent. Accordingly, the new entrant increases the
class of individuals who are benefited by the second entry.
The FDA seems systematically to underestimate the benefits
from product diversification and underestimate the costs of delaying
new entry. In general, it assumes that all product users are pretty
much alike. But that need not be the case, and there could well be
some small group of individuals that could benefit from the new
product that does not do very well on some established treatments.
To be sure, there is no certainty in any of this, but it should be
stressed that any decision by the FDA to let some new drug on the
market does not mean that someone will choose to use it, or that
patients will make any life-or-death decision on the use of a new or
dangerous drug without professional assistance, usually by physicians
whose precise knowledge of the facts and circumstances of a given
case puts them in a far better position to make these individuated
futile response to their article, see Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of
State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. REv.463, 468-73 (2009).
25. See Pollack, supra note 11.
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judgments than the FDA, which of necessity only operates on the
strength of averages.
Nor is it possible to overlook the even larger effects of delay with
respect to those drugs that do, on a belated basis, make it onto the
market at which point they become the dominant drug. Finding
estimates of these figures is not easy to do but an instructive study by
Tomas Philipson and his coauthors
... find[s] that PDUFA raised the private surplus of producers,
and thus innovative returns, by about $7 to $11 billion.
Depending on assumptions about the market power of
producers during patent protection, [they found] that PDUFA
raised consumer welfare between $7 and $20 billion; thus the
combined social surplus was raised by $14 to $31 billion.
Those impressive numbers arise in connection with a study that
examines how a reduction under PDUFA leads to reduction in
approval times by at most several months. But the entire structure of
clinical trials prior to the submission of a new drug application is
today far more drawn out than that, for PDUFA does nothing at all
to change the various norms that govern clinical trials prior to the
submission of a final application, which is where the vast amount of
the delay takes place. We get a lower bound estimate of these
potential gains from new entry by looking at those drugs that do
make it onto the market, by determining both its effectiveness in the
population that it serves and the years of delay before entrance takes
place. But the correct estimation of the losses from tardy clinical
trials has to make two further adjustments. The first of these is to
guess the number of clinical trials that were either stopped or never
attempted in anticipation of the gauntlet that they would be required
to run. The second is to estimate the dangers from letting bad drugs
on the market that then have to be subsequently removed. Philipson
and his colleagues seek to get a handle on this number by asking
about the number of individuals who have been harmed by products
that were eventually taken off the market because of some defect,
only to find that this number is small relative to the lives saved from
earlier entry onto the market, even if it could be assumed that all
product withdrawals were related to some defect in the PDUFA
process, a manifestly conservative assumption. Their estimate of lives
saved from getting drugs more quickly to market runs from between
26. See Philipson et al., supra note 20.
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140,000 and 310,000 life years. 27 The extreme estimate of the lives put
at risk tops out at 56,000 life years lost. From an ex ante perspective,
people behind the veil of ignorance surely do better by a decision to
take prudent risks.
The basic point is reinforced looking at the situation with COX-2
inhibitors, where the removal of Vioxx from the marketplace in
September 2004 made Celebrex the dominant player in the market."8
Yet some patients will do better under the former drug than the
latter; and it could well be that some alternation between two drugs
could be superior to a steady diet of the one. In addition, there could
be specialized uses, such as the control of bleeding after surgery, in
which Vioxx outperforms Celebrex. For these purposes, it does not
matter that we are talking about removing an existing drug from the
market, instead of adding a new one. Either way, the contraction of
the patient's choice set comes at a very high price, for if downstream
users are in general best able to decide which drug is more effective in
given settings, the irreversible decision of FDA forces many people to
settle for second best. For these purposes, it hardly matters whether
the loss in private choice stems from an underprotective patent
system or from an overzealous FDA.
The positive effects of new entry are likely to be more dramatic if
the new entrant comes from a previously undeveloped class of new
drugs, which opens up some alternative pathways to treatment. At
this point, the high price for the new drug has to be put into
perspective. The amount of money that people can pay for a drug is
strictly limited by their net worth. The amount of benefit that they
can obtain from a drug is often measured by increased longevity and
quality of life, which could be far greater than this willingness-to-pay
measure. It is therefore incumbent on the legal system to take steps
to make sure that these new entries take place. The constant sniping
at the abuse of the six month co-exclusivity period, or the attacks on
"product hopping" through the use of multiple patents of different
strength on a given product thus have to be put in the perspective of
knowing the second-best situation that exists in the new drug market.
Improvement on that margin has to be measured against the decline
of new entry.
How this is to be done is hard to estimate in the abstract. In
order to get traction on this issue, it is critical to develop some data
27. Id.
28. For my account, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: How EXCESSIVE
REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 132 (2006).
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on questions that are insufficiently explored: how long do generic
drugs remain on the market? The issue here is complex because one
social advantage to branded drugs is that single ownership leads to
extensive advertisement which can get the drug into the hands of high
demanders. Generic drugs tend to be less promoted, and it is an open
question whether the knowledge of their desirable properties in the
hands of HMO offer sufficient offset for the loss of marketing efforts.
That question in turn may well depend on whether a competition
between a first generation generic and a second generic patented drug
will come out in favor of the former even in the face of substantial
price differentials in favor of the generic drug. Clearly there is no
necessary answer to any of these questions. But the very uncertainty
about the underlying choice is reason enough to be cautious about
any fresh efforts to advantage the generic drugs at the expense of
their branded rivals. And the ultimate irony may well be this: the
next generation of generic drugs is the current generation of patented
drugs. Let the spigot shut too tightly and both sides of the market
could suffer.
IV. Conclusion: What Next?
It is difficult to know the proper way for patent law to respond to
the clear breakdown in the overall drug approval system. My own
preference is to increase the Hatch-Waxman offsets so that it is
possible to obtain one year of additional patent protection for each
year that an approved patented drug languishes in clinical trials. At
this point, the FDA may sense that its own decisions will have real
impact on the switch from branded to generic drug status, which
could perhaps induce it to expedite its hearings in order to capture
some of the benefits hinted at by the PDUFA studies of Philipson and
his colleagues. The needed extension would be as much as four or
five more years for many blockbuster drugs, which is worth billions of
dollars more than the six month extensions that have been associated
with the coexclusivity period. But if the gain from their use is as large
as I suspect it is, this fundamental reform should cast a new light on
the various coexclusivity deals. In my own view, I have cautiously
come to think that the law ought to take this position. Let the
incumbent and the first entrant divide the market between them in
whatever way they see fit. In the end we should expect them to seek
to maximize their joint product by choosing the same prices and
quantities as the single incumbent had done before the patent was
invalidated. Taking this position therefore has two advantages. First,
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it simplifies what is now a complex and inconclusive inquiry as to
which of these arrangements pass the rule of reason test and which of
them do not. Second it probably corrects the current imbalance in
the system, stemming from the short period of exclusively left under
the current regime. At worst, therefore, this maneuver looks like an
extra six months on the patent life, which is welcome in its own right.
The gains from additional stimulation today could easily offset the
monopolization effects down the road. Put otherwise, this approach
makes best in the second best world by addressing the more
fundamental flaw in the patent system: too-short initial terms.
